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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Hartford Ins. v. . Manor
Inti:
STATE'S DUTY TO
PROTECT AGAINST
THIRD PARTY
INJURIES DOES
NOT OVERRIDE
RECOGNIZED
TORT LAW
PRINCIPLE OF
INTERVENING
CAUSATION IN
NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS.

In Hartford Ins. Co. v.
Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135,642
A.2d 219 (1994), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland examined
proximate and superseding causation particularly as they relate
to the State's duty to protect
against third party injuries. In a
unanimous decision, the court
determined that, notwithstanding the State's duty to protect
against third party injuries, liability rightfully attaches to the
individual whose acts amount
to the superseding, intervening
events which break the chain of
proximate causation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
general tort law principle that
superseding, intervening forces
or events sever the chain oflegal
or proximate causation such that
liability ceases to attach to the
original tortfeasor.
Robert
Wewer
("Wewer") sustained personal
injuries and property damage
when his vehicle collided with
another vehicle operated by
Robert Lee Griffin ("Griffin"),
an escaped mental patient of
Springfield State Hospital
("Springfield"), the mental institution to which Griffin had
been involuntarily committed.
Griffin had stolen the vehicle
after an employee ofManor Inn
("Hotel") left the vehicle unattended with the doors unlocked
and the keys in the ignition.
Having fully paid Wewer' s subsequent insurance claim, Hartford Insurance Company ("Insurer") brought a subrogation
claim against the State and the
hotel to recover damages paid
on behalfof Wewer. Finding no

material facts in dispute, the
trial court granted the State's
motion for summary judgment.
Moreover, the court, suasponte,
entered summary judgment in
favor of the hotel.
Finding no error, the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the decision
ofthe trial court. Subsequently,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether the state had a
duty to protect Wewer from the
collision which resulted as the
unforeseeable consequence of
Griffin's escape and whether the
hotel employee's negligence in
leaving the van unattended was
the proximate cause ofWewer's
InJunes.
Before addressing these
questions, the court confronted
the threshold issue of whether
the trial court could sua sponte
enter summary judgment in favor ofthe hotel when neither the
insurer nor the hotel moved for
summary judgment. The court
first noted that the purpose of
the summary judgment procedure is to decide whether there
is an issue of fact sufficiently
material to be tried. Hartford
Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md.
135, 144, 642 A.2d 219, 224
(1994). The court then focused
on Maryland Rule 2-50 1(e) and
considered whether the trial
court properly entered summary judgment in favor of one party against another absent a motion by a moving party. In relevant part, Rule 2-501(e) provides:
Upon motion of a party, the
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court shall enter judgment in
favor of the [moving] party if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Id at 146,642 A.2d at 224.
Acknowledging the trial court's error in granting summary judgment, the court nevertheless decided the issue as to
the hotel's liability "to avoid
the expense and delay of another appeal." Id at 147,642 A.2d
at 225. Remarking that the trial
record was void of any motion
for summary judgment by the
hotel, the court of appeals concluded that such failure to move
for summary judgment amounted to a tactical decision by the
hotel. Id The court reasoned
that had the matter been reversed, the hotel "would simply
file a motion for summary judgment against the [insurer] and a
second appeal presenting the
same issue between those parties would be almost inevitable." Id. Hence, the court held
that the action of the trial court
amounted to harmless error for
which reversal would be impractical.
The court of appeals
next considered whether the
state had a duty to protect
Wewer from the collision which
resulted as the unforeseeable
consequence ofGriffin , s escape
from Springfield. In addition,
the court considered whether
the hotel employee's negligence

in leaving the vehicle unattended was the proximate cause of
Wewer's injuries. After examining each issue, the court found
the State had no duty to protect
Wewer from the collision because the collision was not a
foreseeable consequence of
Griffin's elopement from
Springfield. Moreover, the court
found the hotel employee's negligence in leaving the vehicle
unattended was not the proximate cause ofWewer's injuries.
In addressing whether
the state breached a duty owed
to Wewer by failing to control
Griffin's conduct, the court relied onAshburnv. AnneArundel
County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d
1078 (1986). Id at 150, 642
A.2d at 226. In Ashburn, the
court held that, absent a "special relationship" either between
the actor and the third person or
between the actor and the person injured, there existed no
duty to control the conduct ofa
third person. Id. (citing
Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628, 510
A.2d at 1083). Moreover, the
court of appeals reaffirmed its
adoption of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 315,
which addresses the duty of
those in charge of persons having dangerous propensities, further providing an exception to
the general duty rule. Noting
the exception's particular applicability to custodial situations,
the court concluded that a special relationship existed between
Griffin and the State while he
was in the State's custody as a
patient at Springfield. The court
further considered whether such
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relationship continued following Griffin's escape. Id at 151,
642 A.2d at 227.
The court opined that to
hold the State liable for its negligent conduct in failing to control or detain Griffin would
amount to holding the State liable for the unreasonably remote
consequences of Griffin's own
negligence. Id The court further explained that "it could not
be foreseen that Griffin, having
eloped, would . . . steal a van,
and drive it negligently, thus
causing an accident." Id Recognizing the inappropriateness
of holding the State liable for
remote and unforeseeable consequences, the court further applied the foreseeability analyses
set forth in the seminal cases of

Palsgraj v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)
and Tarasoff v. Regents oj the
Univ. oj Cal., 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976). The court ultimately concluded that a duty
would only be found in favor of
readily identifiable plaintiffs, i. e.,
those within a foreseeable zone
of danger whose identities are
known in advance. Hartford,
335 Md. at 154, 642 A.2d at
228.
Moreover, in its analysis of the hotel's liability for
injuries to Wewer, the court
determined that the insurer must
prove that the hotel's negligence
was the proximate cause of the
accident. Id at 154, 642 A.2d
at 229. Thereafter, the court
further questioned whether Griffin's negligent operation of the
van broke the chain ofcausation
flowing from the hotel's negli-
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gence. Id. at 157,642 A.2d at
230. Recognizing the significance of proximate and superseding causation, the court held
that "while the negligence of
[the hotel] clearly was the proximate cause of the theft of the
van, it does not follow that the
causal relationship continued
from the moment of the theft to
the moment of impact between
the van and Wewer's car." Id
at 160, 642 A.2d at 232.
The court concluded its
analysis by determining that the
hotel's negligence in leaving the
keys in the ignition of the van
was not the proximate cause of
Wewer's injuries but merely the
proximate cause of theft of the
van. Hence, the court determined that:
[A]lthough an injury might not
have occurred "but for" an an-

tecedent act of the defendant,
liability may not be imposed if
. . . the negligence ofone person
is merely passive and potential,
while the negligence of another
is the moving and effective cause
ofthe injury ... [o]r ifthe injury
is so remote in time and space
from defendant's original negligence and another's negligence
intervenes.
Id at 156, 642 A.2d at 230
(citations omitted).
The court in Hartford
Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn resolves
the question of whether the
State's duty to protect against
injuries to third parties overrides the general tort law principle concerning the effect of superseding, intervening acts on
legal or proximate causation.
Specifically, the court avers that
liability of an initial negligent

actor cannot lie where his acts
are not the moving and effective
cause of the resulting injury .
Rather, such intervening acts
supersede the initial negligent
act and become the proximate
cause of the injury. More importantly, this general tort law
principle is recognized even if
the negligent acts of another
amount to the intervening agency which results in injury to a
third party for which the State
would otherwise have a duty to
protect.
- Lisa Y. Johnson
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